Dissent

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei spoke. Ironically, he spoke to the world from the university campus which witnessed acts of violence and where the alleged murder of students by the regime’s militia took place. He asserted his moral and religious authority and assured his people that no wrong-doing took place during last weeks election. Thus in one breath he endorsed and legitimised Ahmadinejad’s election and sent out a strong warning to opponents, dissenters and protesters.  

Khamenei’s position is quite fragile. If the allegations of vote-rigging hold any water than it either means that the Ayatollah has lost control and no longer enjoys supreme authority within the regime or else he was aware of any wrong doing and thus a partner in crime with Ahmadinejad.

Why is the regime so scared? As long as the protests are peaceful and non violent it should give its blessing to the protests and exhibit the Republic’s democratic credentials.

Closing down local newspapers, barring foreign reporters from covering these historic events and blocking internet and telecommunication channels is a sign of fear. Fear of transparency and freedom of expression and information. Only a defensive regime in siege mentality mode comes up with such drastic measures.

Ahmadinejad might have vast support amongst the poorer rural conservatives but that support can only be lost if he cannot manage the economy and the country well. Furthermore if Ahmadinejad and the regime continue repressing woman, political opponents and use violence and bullying tactics to curb civil and social rights than it will backfire big time in the next few years. With over half the Iranian population under the age of 30 and an ever growing student population, the regime will face greater opposition.

Ahmadinejad’s opponents do not want to dismantle the Islamic Revolution. All they want to do is reform the country within the structures of the Islamic Revolution.  There are drastic differences between the reformist and conservative camps. The reformists argue in favour of woman’s rights, never denied the holocaust, harshly criticise the regimes failure in managing the economy (in recent years the Iranian central bank had four different governors) and the regimes rudderless foreign policy which has only created enemies, old and new, and humiliated the Iranian population. These differences do not necessarily mean that if the Reformists, under the guidance of Mousavi or Rasfajani, are in power they would radically change Iran’s foreign policy. All parties in Iran agree with the nuclear programme. Yet with the reformists in power it is much easier to envisage radical changes in national affairs and maybe even in the Islamic Revolution’s structure. Also, the rest of the world will feel much more at ease in dealing with Mousavi rather than with a bully.